Governing New Jersey: Reflections on the Publication of a Revised and Expanded Edition of \u27The Governors of New Jersey\u27 by Birkner, Michael J.
History Faculty Publications History
Summer 2015
Governing New Jersey: Reflections on the
Publication of a Revised and Expanded Edition of
'The Governors of New Jersey'
Michael J. Birkner
Gettysburg College
Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac
Part of the American Politics Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States
History Commons
Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.
This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of
the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac/57
This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an
authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.
Birkner, Michael J. "Governing New Jersey: Reflections on the Publication of a Revised and Expanded Edition of 'The Governors of
New Jersey.'" New Jersey Studies 1.1 (Summer 2015), 1-17.
Governing New Jersey: Reflections on the Publication of a Revised and
Expanded Edition of 'The Governors of New Jersey'
Abstract
New Jersey’s chief executive enjoys more authority than any but a handful of governors in the United States.
Historically speaking, however, New Jersey’s governors exercised less influence than met the eye. In the
colonial period few proprietary or royal governors were able to make policy in the face of combative
assemblies. The Revolutionary generation’s hostility to executive power contributed to a weak governor
system that carried over into the 19th and 20th centuries, until the Constitution was thoroughly revised in
1947. Before that date a handful of governors, by dint of their ideas and personalities, affected the polity in
meaningful ways. Derived from a lecture delivered at Rutgers University’s Eagleton Institute on March 11,
2014, this essay focuses on the long history of the executive office, assessing individual governors and
delineating the qualities that made them noteworthy, for good or ill.
Keywords
New Jersey, Governor, Executive Office
Disciplines
American Politics | History | Political History | United States History
Comments
This article is written about the author's 2014 book, The Governors of New Jersey: Biographical Essays.
This article is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac/57
NJS: An Interdisciplinary Journal Summer 2015 1 
 
Governing New Jersey: Reflections on the publication of a revised and expanded 
edition of The Governors of New Jersey, edited by Michael J. Birkner, Donald Linky, and 
Peter Mickulas (Rutgers University Press, 2014) 
By Michael J. Birkner 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14713/njs.v1i1.10  
Abstract 
New Jersey’s chief executive enjoys more authority than any but a handful of governors 
in the United States. Historically speaking, however, New Jersey’s governors exercised less 
influence than met the eye.  In the colonial period few proprietary or royal governors were able 
to make policy in the face of combative assemblies. The Revolutionary generation’s hostility to 
executive power contributed to a weak governor system that carried over into the 19th and 20th 
centuries, until the Constitution was thoroughly revised in 1947. Before that date a handful of 
governors, by dint of their ideas and personalities, affected the polity in meaningful ways.  
Derived from a lecture delivered at Rutgers University’s Eagleton Institute on March 11, 2014, 
this essay focuses on the long history of the executive office, assessing individual governors and 
delineating the qualities that made them noteworthy, for good or ill. 
 
Commencing my observations about the office of the governor and the people who have 
inhabited it in New Jersey over the past three and a half centuries, I’m reminded of a comment 
made by Governor Thomas Kean at a symposium three decades ago at the capitol marking the 
publication of the first edition. Kean had been in office only a few weeks when he attended a 
national governors’ conference and learned that the outgoing governor of Tennessee had just 
NJS: An Interdisciplinary Journal Summer 2015 2 
 
been remanded to state prison for corruption.1 To judge by the laughter his remark provoked, it 
lightened the atmosphere at the symposium. It is possible that some of the crowd that day may 
have missed the point Kean implicitly made: the governorship is a public trust.     
Having examined the governor’s office and its occupants from a distinctive angle—in 
effect watching governors parade by, from the 1660s to Chris Christie—I have noticed highs and 
lows of performance and popularity, as well as patterns in the governors’ exercise of power. 
In my remarks today I’ll focus on three main themes. Those are first, the powers of the 
office as they have evolved over time; second, the quality of the New Jersey governors, 
especially as we consider the governors of the modern era; and finally, the prevalence of 
corruption in one or another form—this is, after all, New Jersey.2 
First, powers, with a detour into scandal. When I was invited to coedit the original edition 
of the governors’ book, as a young PhD student back in the late 1970s, I knew little about New 
Jersey governors of the colonial era, but undertook the project assuming they were powerful 
figures. After all, the Proprietary Governors were key players in East Jersey and West Jersey, 
respectively, men of means who had the right connections. Further, the Royal governors who 
served from 1702 to 1776 were governing with the imprimatur of the monarch across the ocean, 
representing royal authority in his majesty’s colony. So surely they were powerful executives 
also.  
Wrong. Or at least mostly wrong. On closer examination it turns out that the most 
operative words in evaluating most governors in the century from New Jersey’s founding into the 
                                                        
1 For a transcript, see Three Decades of the Governor’s Office: A Panel Discussion (Trenton: New Jersey Historical 
Commission, 1983). Kean’s remark is on page 22. 
2 In a stunning example of cognitive dissonance, early in 2012 the Center for Public Integrity released a report 
detailing the risk of corruption and lack of accountability in all fifty states, ranking New Jersey as the least corrupt 
state according to its metrics. These included tough ethics and anti-corruption laws, transparency of accounting, and 
the “hard work” of good government groups and legislators. Anyone who follows New Jersey politics closely is 
likely to notice a disconnect between the center’s conclusions and reality on the ground.  For the Center for Public 
Integrity analysis, see http://247WallSt.com/special-report/2012/03/22/Americas-least -corrupt-states/   
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Revolutionary era are “frustrated,” “disengaged,” and “tormented by local elites who were 
determined to have their way.” It is true that several governors who served New Jersey in the 
colonial era were diligent and, for certain periods at least, reasonably effective. Lewis Morris, 
Francis Bernard, and William Franklin fit this description, though Bernard served only two years 
and Franklin’s effectiveness lasted only until resistance to the British tax and regulatory policies 
(what the British called “equity and efficiency”) transformed into outright rebellion. 
New Jersey’s governors in the colonial era were, in the main, people who had the right 
political connections, men who hoped to parlay those connections and their role as governor into 
financial benefit. It did not work out that way for most of them. Some, like Edmond Andros, 
tried to enhance their influence with the crown by clamping down on the proprietors’ freedom 
from paying duties to the King. That did not work out well. Neither did his campaign of 
persecution of proprietor Philip Carteret, who had served as the colony’s first governor. But by 
and large it did not matter whether a governor was forceful or not. Patricia Bonomi has reminded 
us that in an age before party politics had taken hold either in Britain or the American colonies, 
local elites played a game of politics without rules, using any tools available to resist and, if 
necessary, tear down executive authority that might impinge on their local interests.3 Therein lies 
a tale. 
Probably the most famous—or infamous—New Jersey governor of the colonial era was 
Edward Hyde, Lord Cornbury, who for about three centuries has been best known as the state’s 
transvestite governor, because he allegedly dressed in women’s clothing so as better to represent 
his sovereign, Queen Anne. Cornbury’s road to the governorship of New Jersey was 
                                                        
3 Patricia U. Bonomi. The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
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unexceptional. He was well born in England, had military experience and excellent royal 
connections, and needed money. When in 1702 the proprietors of East and West Jersey 
surrendered their charters to the crown, Queen Anne combined them into a single royal colony 
and appointed Cornbury as governor. So far, nothing out of the ordinary. Cornbury’s objective 
ostensibly was to assert royal authority in New Jersey, but like many of his successors, he was 
more interested in enhancing his personal finances. He was not successful on either track, thanks 
in part to the consistent, debilitating opposition of Lewis Morris and other local power brokers. 
Opposition to Cornbury in both New York and New Jersey drew on charges against him in the 
London press. By 1708 the Lords of Trade in London concluded that Cornbury had to go, and he 
was replaced by a military man, John Lovelace.  Lovelace lasted less than a year before dying in 
office.  
 It was in context of the hardball game played against Cornbury, which included 
allegations of bribery against him, that the transvestite issue was raised. Cornbury’s supposed 
cross-dressing was first bruited by his political opponents, who said he enjoyed wearing his 
wife’s clothes while walking about town. In one account of the story that you can readily find on 
the internet, four letters, written by three different people, all enemies of Cornbury’s, around the 
time of his recall to England, mention this supposed habit.  The identification of Cornbury as a 
cross-dresser continued right into the first edition of the Governors’ book. In that volume Paul 
Stellhorn and I published a copy of an oil painting of a person alleged to be Cornbury, wearing 
woman’s clothes. We said nothing about this being a “supposed” portrait of him. Indeed, the 
essay on Cornbury we published in 1982 affirmed that Cornbury was a cross-dresser. 
There are problems with this attribution, starting with the fact that none of Cornbury’s 
political friends or detached observers ever mentioned that he cross-dressed. The oil painting, as 
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Professor Bonomi determined after rigorous investigation, has no meaningful provenance aside 
from its exhibition in 1867 at the New York Historical Society and a label affixed on it at that 
time. In her book, The Lord Cornbury Scandal, Bonomi portrays her subject as neither the 
corrupt executive depicted by his political foes nor a transvestite. He was, quite simply, 
unpopular with local elites, and in that he was not much different from his successors. In 
Bonomi’s account, he was not a tyrant, eccentric, or corrupt leader, but rather a conscientious 
and reasonably effective proponent of imperial power over the colonies—and the unfortunate 
target of a nasty Whig press back in London.  Such is the depiction of Cornbury in Marc 
Mappen’s essay for The Governors of New Jersey.  
And yet:  there is rarely a last word in history.  Reviewing Bonomi’s book for The New 
Republic, Alan Taylor suggested that Bonomi’s revisionism regarding Cornbury was in need of 
revising.  In his essay Taylor argued that Bonomi ignored the “most sordid aspect” of Cornbury’s 
governorship: exploitation of his land grant-making power.4 “To enrich himself with fees and his 
political cronies with massive tracts of frontier land,” Taylor notes, Cornbury “sacrificed the 
interests of Indians and common settlers—and violated instructions from the Crown to limit each 
new land grant to 1000 acres.” Taylor’s verdict on Cornbury? He was “a royal governor of 
mediocre talents and morality. He was neither the paragon of imperial duty depicted by Bonomi 
nor the utter blackguard of his enemies’ accusations.”  As for Cornbury as transvestite, Taylor is 
agnostic. “Not proven,” he observes, “is not the same as not guilty.” Future scholars will have an 
                                                        
4 Taylor’s review essay originally appeared under the headline, “Devil in a Blue Dress,” in the August 3, 1998 
number of The New Republic. It has been reprinted in Taylor’s collection of essays, Writing Early American 
History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), pp. 120-127. 
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opportunity to weigh in as new evidence will perhaps afford yet another fresh take on this 
intriguing episode in New Jersey history.  
Whatever one’s thinking about Lord Cornbury, the fundamental point remains: colonial 
governors were not nearly as powerful as you might expect. They were caught between the 
dynamics of provincial politics, which was usually factional and intense, and the imperial 
patronage system. Those who view the governorship as a power base do not need to envy the 
colonial governors. 
For that matter, they do not need to envy the governors who followed. 
The American Revolution is well known as a movement against taxation without 
representation and executive authority.  Generations of scholars, perhaps none more influentially 
than Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood, delineated the ideology of the Revolutionary elite and 
their fears of unchecked executive power.5 They traced the intersection of this ideology with the 
American rebels’ organized activity against the British crown beginning in the early 1760s.  It is 
no surprise in this context that under the Constitution of 1776 in New Jersey, as in most other 
states in the new republic, legislatures, not governors, were believed to be the proper institutions 
of authority. Hence from 1776 until circumstances led to a major constitutional revision in 1844, 
the governor had no specific executive responsibilities and few patronage powers. He had no 
formal influence in the making of legislation, no powers of fiscal control, no meaningful veto of 
bills he did not like. The governor commanded the largely inert state militia; served as presiding 
judge of the highest appeals court, and could cast tie-breaking votes, as needed, in the legislative 
                                                        
5 Both Bailyn and Wood have written extensively on this subject, including Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967) and Wood’s The Creation of the American 
Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). 
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council. But he was not responsible for carrying out the legislature’s programs and policies or 
enforcing its laws.6 
Is it any surprise that under such an arrangement, some individuals of real ability chose 
not to pursue the office? Indeed, one leading politician who was elected to the position, Garret D. 
Wall, actually turned it down in 1829, the only person in state history to do so.  Wall was more 
interested in serving as U.S. attorney for New Jersey, a federal patronage job in the gift of 
President-elect Andrew Jackson, for whom he had vigorously campaigned in 1828.  Although 
Jackson did not carry New Jersey that year, he soon made the appointment.7 Just a few years 
after Wall turned down the governorship, the anti-Jacksonian party leader, Samuel L. Southard, 
resigned months into his term as governor to accept election to the U.S. Senate.   In the early 19th 
century, unlike today, the governorship offered few opportunities for constructive leadership, as 
Southard and Wall both appreciated. 8  The U.S. Senate, as Southard reminded his political 
friends, was where the action was.  How matters have changed! 
All the same, as any serious student of politics knows, political power does not 
necessarily lie simply in constitutional arrangements.  Governors can be effective leaders even 
working within the constraints of a constitutional system that stacks the deck in the legislature’s 
favor.  William Livingston, the first governor under the 1776 Constitution, led by dint of his 
character and forceful style. So did Joseph Bloomfield, governor for nine one-year terms early in 
the 19th century, on largely the same grounds—though it must be added that Bloomfield was able 
                                                        
6 See, for example, Charles R. Erdman, Jr., The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1929).  For good brief explications of the new constitutional arrangement, see Richard P. McCormick, 
Experiment in Independence: New Jersey in the Critical Period, 1781-1789 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1950), pp. 70-74 and idem., New Jersey From Colony to State, 1609-1789 (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 122-124. 
7 On Wall’s decision to decline service as governor, see Duane Lockard, The New Jersey Governor: A Study in 
Political Power (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), p. 50.   
8 The circumstances surrounding Southard’s taking and leaving the governorship are discussed in Michael Birkner, 
Samuel L. Southard: Jeffersonian Whig (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984), pp. 134-142. 
NJS: An Interdisciplinary Journal Summer 2015 8 
 
to exert his influence only in conjunction with the Jeffersonian Republicans’ formidable 
legislative caucus. From a different angle, that of vigorous party leader, Peter Vroom also served 
for six one-year terms (1829-1832, 1834-1837), demonstrating that a governor could be active in 
his party caucus and effective in shaping policy. He exerted influence even as his Democratic 
allies divided over the transportation monopoly (the Camden & Amboy Railroad and Delaware 
and Raritan Canal “joint” company) that Vroom himself had originally supported, yet ultimately 
decided needed to be checked. By 1832 Vroom joined President Andrew Jackson in fighting the 
“Monster” Bank of the United States, and he remained a foe of the Bank until it was finally left 
for dead.9 
Over time, as immigration accelerated, New Jersey’s population grew and cities like 
Newark and Paterson led the way toward a more balanced and integrated economy.  Under new 
conditions the constitutional order of 1776 proved inadequate to the state’s needs. Governor 
Vroom, among other political notables, contended that the governor’s office needed to be 
strengthened, so that it was less the cat’s paw of the legislature.  That could be accomplished by 
taking the election of the governor from the legislature and giving it to the people, and also by 
enhancing the governor’s authority to veto legislation.  
Peter Vroom also sought to separate the governor’s office from the judiciary by ending 
the governor’s tenure as Chancellor, hence moving New Jersey’s governance toward a true 
separation of powers. The movement for a new constitution succeeded in 1844.  Yet as Duane 
Lockard has noted, there was no dramatic change in the relationship between the governor and 
the legislature. For the most part, the legislature continued to dominate policymaking. Only the 
                                                        
9 For elaboration, consult the essays on these individuals in The Governors of New Jersey. 
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exceptional governor made much of an impact on policy making in New Jersey. Indeed, during 
the next century, the New Jersey governorship was, if not toothless, at best an office where 
placeholders predominated. Strong executive leadership was uncommon. 10  Among the 
exceptions was Leon Abbett, the champion of immigrant interests and regulation of railroads. 
Abbett served two non-consecutive terms in the late 19th century and forged an enviable record. 
Although he was not quite the reform-minded paragon his biographer Richard Hogarty makes 
him out to be, I would readily include him on a list of the state’s top ten governors.11 
Perhaps no governor made more impact in a shorter time frame than Woodrow Wilson 
(1911-12), who showed in his brief tenure that the governor of New Jersey could press an 
ambitious legislative agenda and make things happen. Wilson was so effective as a champion of 
progressive issues, as Arthur Link has shown, that his governorship served as springboard to his 
successful presidential candidacy in 1912.  To this day Wilson enjoys pride of place as the only 
New Jerseyan elected president. 
It was not until 1947 that we reach the era of the modern governorship, the office infused 
with new authority, thanks in good measure to the efforts of Alfred E. Driscoll.  A recent article 
about Chris Christie in The New Republic calls the governor of New Jersey the “most powerful” 
in the nation.12 Other observers, including the late Alan Rosenthal and political scientist Thad 
Beyle, are more restrained but still recognize that the governor of New Jersey has formidable 
tools for effective governance. They place New Jersey among the top six states with strong 
governors. By Beyle’s calculation, the others were Massachusetts, Alaska, Maryland, New York, 
                                                        
10 Duane Lockard, The New Jersey Governor: A Study in Political Power (Princeton, NJ:  D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc., 1964), chapters 3-5. 
11 Richard A. Hogarty, Leon Abbett’s New Jersey: The Emergence of the Modern Governor (Philadelphia: 
American Philosophical Society, 2001). 
12 Alec Macgillis, “Woke Up This Morning and All That Love Had Gone: The Rise and Fall of Chris Christie,” The 
New Republic, March 3, 2014, pp. 14-25.  It is worth noting that in Ryan Lizza’s recent, coruscating account of 
Governor Christie’s political career, he quotes Thomas Kean calling the New Jersey governorship “the most 
powerful in the country.” Lizza, “Crossing Chris Christie,” The New Yorker, April 13, 2014, p. 46. 
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and West Virginia.13 Whether “most powerful” or “one of the most powerful” executive offices 
in the land, it is evident that the New Jersey governor has a great opportunity to exert influence, 
if the constitutionally mandated authority is combined with political skill. 
What makes the current governor’s office powerful? The New Jersey governor nominates 
the attorney general and the state treasurer. The governor also determines the size of the budget, 
fills hundreds of well-paying slots on the state’s many commissions and authorities, and doles 
out aid to its hundreds of towns and cities. In the words of the journalist Alec Macgillis, “no 
governor in modern memory has worked these levers as skillfully as [Chris] Christie.” A reader 
of the latest edition of The Governors of New Jersey might reasonably take issue with that 
statement. Since 1947 New Jersey has produced a remarkable crop of governors—I refer now to 
elected governors—and one effective governor who was not elected: Richard Codey.  If I were to 
play a parlor game in evaluating the governors since 1947, not counting Christie, who is still in 
office, it would play out something like this. I would place the post-1947 governors in four 
categories: outstanding, strong but deficient in certain respects, mediocre, and distinctly 
disappointing. I’d then make a case that out of the state’s ten elected governors since 1947, five 
were outstanding, three strong but deficient, one mediocre, and one distinctly disappointing. 
Further, in terms of the sixty years between 1948 and 2008, in thirty-nine of them the governor 
was outstanding. I’m referring to five two-term governors: Driscoll, Meyner, Hughes, Byrne, and 
Kean. Cahill, Florio and Whitman were strong executives, but deficient in certain respects, 
Corzine was mediocre, and McGreevey disappointing. 
                                                        
13 Alan Rosenthal, The Best Job in Politics: Exploring How Governors Succeed as Policy Leaders (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: CQ Press, 2012); Thad Kousser and Justin H. Phillips, The Power of American Governors: Winning on 
Budgets and Losing on Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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I’d go a step further and suggest that the five governors I list as outstanding are easily 
among the ten best governors New Jersey ever had, joined in that elite category by Woodrow 
Wilson, Leon Abbett, William Livingston, Peter Vroom, and Joseph Bloomfield.   
For details on the modern governors I refer you to the essays in The Governors of New 
Jersey. Living in New Jersey for part of Brendan Byrne’s governorship, I did not have an exalted 
view of Byrne at the time. My image was of a governor who enjoyed playing a lot of tennis and 
hobnobbing with celebrities more than spending time at the office. But that was perhaps as 
misleading an image as the notion that Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency was defined by his love 
of golf. Thanks to modern scholarship we now know that Eisenhower was one of the craftiest 
and most effective presidents of the post-World War II era.  As regards Byrne, read Don Linky’s 
essay about him in our new book and you will appreciate the significance of his 
accomplishments.  Read the essays on Driscoll, Meyner, Hughes, and Kean and you will feel 
state pride, seeing how these different personalities inhabited the office in the best sense, setting 
priorities and making things happen. Compare the governorship of New Jersey even in the hands 
of lesser individuals than these and you will notice that the office conveys potential for active 
leadership that you will not see in states like Texas and South Carolina. I must immediately add, 
in light of what I’ve said about governors who served prior to 1947, that there is opportunity for 
someone with political savvy and skills to make an impact even in a weak governor state. But 
having the tools to work with to advance an agenda is a meaningful advantage. The New Jersey 
governor has those tools. 
Before closing I thought it worthwhile to share some observations about which governors 
I like the most, which I found the most intriguing, and which I did not either like or warm up to. 
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So far as liking governors I would give pride of place to three very different characters: 
Vroom, Abbett, and Hughes. Growing up in a Federalist household, and often tagged as a 
conventional partisan during his years in the political trenches from the 1820s through the 1850s, 
Vroom had another dimension. He re-invented himself as governor, fighting the good fight for 
the average citizen against corporate interests at a time when it would have been easier for him to 
cooperate with Robert Stockton and his associates who had a major stake in the so-called Joint 
Transportation Companies. Vroom’s identification with Andrew Jackson’s policies, particularly 
the war against the Bank of the United States, seems to have generated new thinking about 
corporate power in New Jersey.  While Vroom never succeeded in uncoupling the state from its 
agreement with the Joint Companies, he challenged orthodoxy in both parties and put special 
interests in New Jersey on the defensive.14 He also demonstrated that by using the bully pulpit 
and making specific legislative recommendations, the governor could direct attention to a 
program and build support for it.  
Leon Abbett was also a fighter, in his case, for the rights of immigrants—notably Irish 
immigrants—and his support for working men’s causes, among them his sponsorship of a law 
requiring employers to pay their workers in cash rather than in paper scrip or company store 
merchandise. His greatest crusade was to tax the railroads, the leading corporate power in the 
state for decades. The railroads saw Abbett as their enemy and fought him tooth and nail. But 
they lost their tax-exempt status. In this sense Abbett was a harbinger of the progressive 
movement. In his second term Abbett pressed for new labor laws, free public libraries, 
scholarships for Rutgers College students, highway improvements, money for public schools, 
                                                        
14 For elaboration, see Michael J. Birkner, “Peter Vroom and the Politics of Democracy,” in Paul A. Stellhorn, ed., 
Jacksonian New Jersey (Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1979): 11-38.  Helpful context for the anti-
corporation movement is provided in Herbert Ershkowitz, The Origin of the Whig and Democratic Parties: New 
Jersey Politics, 1820-1837 (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), chapter 8. 
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and the creation of new departments of banking and insurance. Presaging Teddy Roosevelt’s 
leadership during the coal strike of 1902, Abbett stepped forward in 1890 as a mediator between 
labor and management in several major New Jersey labor disputes. Abbett was hardly perfect, 
particularly in his association with the noxious boss of Jersey City, but his overall record was 
admirable, especially when compared with the governors who preceded and succeeded him.15 
No discussion of New Jersey governors should ignore Richard Hughes, a genial jurist 
who was considered a throwaway candidate for governor in 1961, running against one of the 
stronger members of the Eisenhower administration, former Secretary of Labor Jim Mitchell. A 
progressive Republican sympathetic to organized labor, Mitchell was the odds-on favorite to win 
the governorship back for the GOP in 1961. But elections are not won on the basis of pundits’ 
predictions. Hughes out-campaigned Mitchell and benefited from the popularity of the Kennedy 
administration in winning an upset victory by fewer than 35,000 votes. During the next eight 
years Hughes forged a remarkable record—in some respects, a smaller scale Great Society.  His 
notable achievements included the rapid expansion of New Jersey’s system of higher education 
and negotiating a complex deal that ensured the survival and improvement of a crucial commuter 
rail line in the Newark-Hudson County area (the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad, now PATH).  
Hughes supported urban renewal programs and a sales tax to pay for expansion of government 
services. This expansion included creating a Department of Community Affairs and various state 
criminal justice agencies, as well as departments of consumer protection and transportation. 
Construction of the Garden States Arts Center in Holmdel and the first ever funding for Public 
Broadcasting in New Jersey and the New Jersey Symphony were Hughes’ initiatives. He was 
                                                        
15 Hogarty, Leon Abbett, passim. 
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critical to the establishment of the Hackensack Meadowlands Commission, which would plan the 
development of that vast tract of land in the most northeastern part of the state. Hughes also 
staunchly supported the Tercentenary Celebrations of 1964, the single most important initiative 
ever in building knowledge of the state’s history and pride in New Jersey.16 
The two most intriguing governors from my perspective were Walter Edge and A. Harry 
Moore, though for different reasons.  For those following with interest the still somewhat murky 
Bridge-gate scandal, one of the most amusing sidebars was learning that Port Authority 
functionary David Wildstein’s nom de plume as a blogger was “Wally Edge.” In using this 
moniker Wildstein playfully assumed the persona of the Princetonian who served two non-
consecutive terms as governor, first during World War I and second during World War II.  By 
most accounts, including Joseph Mahoney’s essay in our book, Edge was an able governor, 
fiscally conservative but concerned about something more than balancing budgets. We need to 
credit Edge for at least three things beyond specific measures enacted during his governorships: 
first, his consistent support for constitutional reform; second, advocating the nomination of 
Alfred Driscoll as his successor; and third, his crucial role in the creation of the Port Authority, 
which proved so essential to the development of Bergen County in the 1920s and beyond.17 Edge 
had another dimension that did not appear in his memoir, A Jerseyman’s Journal, or in the first 
edition of The Governors of New Jersey.  I’m referring to his close association early in his career 
with Nucky Johnson, the colorful boss of Atlantic City who has been brought to exuberant life in 
the ongoing television series, “Boardwalk Empire.” It turns out Walter Edge played his politics 
                                                        
16 For this approach to Hughes’s governorship, I am indebted to Stanley Winters’ essay in The Governors of New 
Jersey and most especially to John B. Wefing, The Life and Times of Richard J. Hughes: The Politics of Civility 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009). 
17 As Jameson Doig has shown, Edge showed in his efforts to create the Port Authority that he had a broad vision of 
how northern New Jersey could develop through regional cooperation. In this he offered a sharp contrast to the 
narrow and suspicious views of Governor James Fielder and other political leaders of this era. Doig, Empire on the 
Hudson: Entrepreneurial Vision and Political Power  at the Port of New York Authority (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 42, 47-48. 
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in private on a different track from his public persona.  Much later, when Nucky Johnson was 
sent to prison, Edge airbrushed him out of his own life story.  No surprise there, but intriguing all 
the same.   
Along the same lines, I will put in a word for A. Harry Moore, who would surely win the 
“Miss Congeniality” award among New Jersey governors if there were one. If Will Rogers never 
met a man he didn’t like, you could say that there wasn’t anyone who didn’t like Harry Moore. 
That helps explain Moore’s consistent success in elective politics. He ran three times for 
governor and once for the U.S. Senate without suffering defeat. Had he run again for governor in 
1943, as Frank Hague urged him to do, Moore likely would have won again. The strong backing 
of Hague in his heyday as boss of Hudson County didn’t hurt.  It’s said of Moore that he had a 
special phone installed in his office in Trenton just to take calls from Hague. I cannot verify that, 
but it’s almost as good as the line in Ken Burns’s biopic about Huey Long in which the narrator 
asserts that Long’s minion and successor as governor, O.K. Allen, signed anything that came 
across his desk, including a leaf that flew in through an open window. I would not call Harry 
Moore a lackey of Frank Hague, but Moore’s career demonstrated that as popular as he was, he 
was closely aligned with the Jersey City boss.  As the state’s chief executive, he lacked vision.  
Nor was he in sync with the zeitgeist of the 1930s and the popular leadership of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Moore may well have been the most conservative Democrat in the U.S. Senate in the 
1930s. That said, Harry Moore was a charming man. There wasn’t a service club he wouldn’t 
visit or a charitable cause he wouldn’t support. He gives the lie to Leo Durocher’s dictum that 
nice guys finish last. 
Governors I couldn’t warm up to are numerous. In the latter decades of the 19th century, 
all too many of the governors were creatures of political machines, allies of corporate interests, 
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and, in some instances, all too forgettable. One memorable figure, George Brinton McClellan, 
was a disappointment in the governor’s office. He did the basics in offering a legislative program 
but rocked no boats. As his biographer notes, McClellan “tended to stress issues on which most 
people could agree.” He was barely a factor in legislative deliberations. At the close of his term 
in 1881, McClellan wrote, he was glad it was over, “as it was becoming a nuisance to be obliged 
to go to Trenton.”  So much for the attractions of high office.  
Let me say a word or two about corruption, since the whiff of scandal is clearly affecting 
our current governor’s standing in New Jersey and his presidential prospects. 
For a state that is often viewed as a political cesspool, historically speaking the 
governorship itself has not been a hotbed of scandal. As I’ve already noted, the so-called 
Cornbury scandal may not have been a scandal at all, but the outcome of a nasty political 
environment. No New Jersey governor has been impeached for crimes and misdemeanors, 
though it is possible James McGreevey might have been had he not resigned once news broke of 
the appointment of his gay lover to a position for which he was clearly unqualified.   
In broader perspective, if association with business people and political allies who were 
themselves unethical or borderline criminal were a criteria for talking about scandal in the 
governor’s office, then dozens of New Jersey governors would probably fit under that umbrella, 
among them the current governor, who earned his political spurs by prosecuting corrupt officials, 
but who, according to journalistic accounts, did so mainly to replace one set of bosses with 
another set with whom he could forge profitable alliances.  
I do not say that to pass judgment on Chris Christie, because we don’t have all the facts 
and it’s far too soon to write him off politically.  I will say that I am glad my co-editors and I 
were in agreement that it would be unwise to commission an essay on Christie for our book 
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while he was still in office. Perspective is essential.  Three decades ago, when the first edition of 
the Governors book was published and the book launch took place in the capitol, Brendan Byrne 
got in what I took as only a semi-facetious jab at Paul Stellhorn and me for not including him in 
that volume.  But would an essay about Brendan Byrne written in 1982 have done him justice? I 
think Governor Byrne today will be pleased by how history treats him in this edition. When next 
there is call for a new edition of The Governors of New Jersey, I trust Chris Christie will get his 
just deserts, whatever they may turn out to be. 
In closing, I hope you sustain your interest in New Jersey’s governance and that as 
citizens you demand the very best.18 
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18 I am grateful to the New Jersey Historical Commission for sponsoring a new edition of the Governors’ book, and 
to the Commission as well as the Eagleton Institute at Rutgers University for inviting me to speak at forums focused 
on the governors of New Jersey.   C. Mike Pride, editor emeritus of the Concord Monitor, William C. Wright, 
former New Jersey state archivist, and Jameson Doig, Emeritus Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School at 
Princeton University, each read an earlier version of this article, which benefited from their comments. 
 
